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WHY ARE SUPPLY CHAIN PROJECTS (NOT) SUCCESSFUL?¥ 
 
    ABSTRACT 
 
 
The goal of this paper is to explain, from a managerial accounting and transaction 
cost perspective, why many supply-chain projects are not continued after an initial research 
phase. A case base of recent projects, governed by different Dutch subsidy agencies, was 
analyzed by means of desk research and semi-structured interviews with key participants. 
These supply chain projects had mainly reduction of energy usage as a focus. It was found 
that the main causes for discontinuity were: the use of different accounting methods in 
different  project stages, a lack of ex ante information on costs and benefits of projects, a 
lack of ex ante agreement on redistribution in the supply chain of such costs and benefits, as 
well as the existence of possibilities to act opportunistically as a result of asymmetrically 
distributed and hidden information. To supply chain managers, we advice to guarantee 
commitment from the top-management of all chain partners at any stage and to address 
measurement and redistribution issues in earlier stages than has been the case in the past. To 
the scientific community we advice to further develop techniques for supply chain 
accounting, with a lead role for cash accounting and the integration of non-financial project 
objectives. 
 





In the Netherlands, in the last ten years a lot of effort and financial means have been invested 
to promote cooperation in supply chains. The early programs aimed at improving supply 
chain efficiency and effectiveness, as well as food safety and risk control in food and agri-
related supply chains. One of the more recent programs is supporting projects to reduce 
energy usage by means of chain cooperation2. Typical to all of these supply chain projects 
was the involvement of research institutes and government subsidy agencies to improve the 
operations and management of the supply chain of the private entities. 
 
In practice and theory, lots of work still have to be done to improve the conditions for 
successful supply-chain cooperation. With “success” we denote lasting cooperation, beyond 
the time-horizon of the project itself. Key success factors are the measurement and 
(eventually) redistribution of project results. These areas have been addressed by different 
disciplines, like project-management, marketing, management accounting, game-theory, 
industrial and social psychology as well as information science (for an overview, see Broens 
and Bremmers, 2007), but they deserve a more systematic approach.  
 
Projects unroll in stages. After an initiation stage, in which the consortium is formed and the 
approach is being agreed upon, the main phase of the supply chain projects under study was a 
feasibility study. Then, if investments or contracts are necessary to realize the energy savings 
or other supply chain optimizations, generally a design stage will be necessary. Then 
                                                 
2
 In 2002 the Dutch agriculture administration together with the environment administration initiated the 
program Sustainable Supply Chains and Energy Usage Reduction (DKE) managed by SenterNovem and ACC. 
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naturally follow the realization and exploitation stages. Although the projects in our case base 
were feasibility studies mainly, we could follow the consortia through the consecutive stages, 
if necessary. 
  
A significant number of projects in the case base we studied had as a goal the acquisition and 
exchange of knowledge between the project partners only. The objectives of the partners did 
not include cooperation after the project horizon, so that the cooperative efforts of the 
consortium partners on the subject in question (e.g. energy savings) did not extend beyond the 
project. One could say, the goal of the cooperation was the project itself. We label them 
‘knowledge projects’. Needless to say, these projects are successful by definition.  
 
For other projects, success is defined as lasting cooperation, during the realisation phase and 
beyond. Our aim is to identify factors that influence such type of success. To do so we focus 
on the factors that have to do with measuring and distributing the results of the cooperation, 
both ex ante and ex post. The goal of this paper is therefore (1) to contribute to the 
development of financial instruments for supply chain accounting and (2) to investigate the 
pitfalls in the process of supply chain project management. 
 
The continued participation of stakeholders in supply chain projects depends on their attitude. 
The ‘calculating participant’ will weigh the costs and benefits against each other in the 
different phases, from his own perspective and using his own value system and measurement 
methodology. Management accounting techniques are not really applicable to supply chain 
costing and pricing under all circumstances. Supply chains often include a multitude of 
stakeholders with conflicting (profit) goals. Moreover, in supply-chain projects a situation of 
information asymmetry exists, which could induce opportunistic behavior. A further 
complication is that project revenues often are intangible of a kind, like improved business 
relations, consumer satisfaction, brand equity, risk reduction and ecological value. These can 
not easily be identified and expressed in money terms. Without an adequate measurement 
methodology for chain costs and benefits it is not possible to take the next step: the 
redistribution of financial outcomes over chain partners. In this paper we will address these 
problem areas and take steps to improve the management of supply chain projects. 
 
We use a grounded-theory approach in which theoretical insights are derived from our 
experiences with practical cases, and the application of these theoretical insights to reality 
leads to a reconsideration of the theoretical basis. The theoretical starting point of this paper is 
given in § 2. Available accounting techniques for measuring and redistributing supply chain 
project results are addressed in § 3. The case base and the main results are described in § 4. In 
§ 5 conclusions will be drawn and recommendations will be given to improve project 
management.  
 
2. Theoretical foundation 
 
In this paragraph we will first provide a foundation for our research using transaction cost 
economics (§ 2.1). Next, in § 2.2, we will describe different supply chain configurations, and 
investigate which configurations create a measurement and/or distribution problem. In § 2.3 




2.1 Transaction cost economics and the supply chain 
 
While earlier economic theorizing addressed the firm as a production function, Ronald Coase 
first regarded the firm as a governance structure (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Williamson, 
1998). The inclusion of the firm as a governance alternative in the theoretical landscape of 
goevrnance represents a shift away from classical economics (Grover and Malhotra 2003). 
Coase posed the question whether transactions (the central units of analyses) could better be 
performed within a hierarchy (firm) or in a market context (Geyskens et al., 2006). 
Governance costs connected to a hierarchy create a tendency towards the market as 
governance structure, were it not that dimensions of transactions – especially uncertainty and 
asset specific investments underlying them – can cause “market failure”. In that case a 
hierarchy is be preferred. Especially asset specific investments create dependency, which can 
lead to shirking (opportunistic exploitation; see in this respect: Clemens et al. (1993). The 
basic supposition  in TCE is that individuals are behaving rational, but this rationality is 
limited (Williamson, 1998), so that contracts are never complete. It is suggested however, that 
trust can replace formal governance mechanisms like monitoring and controls (Griesinger, 
1990). In general, asset specificity forms a strong bias towards hierarchy governance (David 
and Han, 2004; Geyskens et al. 2006; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Therefore commitment to long 
term common investments in supply chain projects can enhance continuity and cohesiveness, 
although such cohesiveness also can obstruct innovativeness (see in this respect Granovetter, 
1973, 1985).  
Uncertainty of transaction results combined with transaction specific investments strengthens 
the preference towards hierarchic governance. Such uncertainty may be both environmental, 
which relates to specifying circumstances of an exchange ex ante, and behavioural, which 
refers to verifying a performance ex post (Grover and Malhotra, 2003). Uncertainty without 
transaction specific investments favours the market (Geyskens et al, 2006). Projects with 
uncertainty about future costs and benefits and their distribution in the supply chain is 
therefore not a fertile soil for teambuilding, trust and cooperation.  
 
2.1.1. Governance of supply chain projects 
The contractual scenery of supply chain projects is complex (see figure 1) and includes four 

































The contract to enter into a supply chain project entails a sub-contract between:  
1. the public subsidizing agency and the research institute, which is involved to provide 
or develop specific technical knowledge; 
2. between the research institute and the supply chain partners, in which the chain 
partners specify problems and desires, and the knowledge institute provides research 
and process management services; 
3. between the supply chain partners and the subsidizing agency, in which the chain 
partners promise to collaborate in an effort to realize common benefits, 
4. between the participating supply chain partners themselves, together in the project 
context referred to as ‘the consortium’. 
 
The complexity of the contractual scenery of supply chain projects, the incompleteness of 
contracts, and the diversity of stakes that are involved, give a fertile ground for the occurrence 
of abundant transaction costs (like costs of information provision, monitoring and control). 
This calls for meticulous process management, for instance by securing goal congruency, 
unity of measurement and synchronization of commitment from the start.  
 
2.2 Supply chain project categorization 
 
Based on the case base we propose a categorization of supply chain projects. We mentioned 
‘knowledge projects’ in the introduction. The more lasting supply-chain projects can be 
discerned in different types. With respect to the reach of the cooperation, a continuum of 
cooperation-options can be described with the alliance on one side of the continuum and 
greenfield investments on the other.  
 
To address the problem of redistributing cooperation results, the techno-economic specifics of 
supply chain investments can be ordered into four dimensions (Broens and Bremmers, 2007): 
(1) Investment-dependency. With investment-dependency we denote the situation, in 
which (a) an investment has to be made (b) by more than one party to make the total 
project a success. Once the investment has been made, the parties are locked-in. The 
investment could be a stand-alone common activity (for instance a new processing 
plant) or could be split up in parts at single business-units (for instance investing in a 
supply-chain logistics system to reduce the delivery time). It can be expected, that 
early joint investments in a chain project lead to mutual dependency, and will be a 
strong indicator for lasting cooperation and integration.  
(2) Value-dependency. This is the situation, in which there are no possibilities outside the 
supply-chain project to earn the initial investment back. However, if such possibilities 
exist, there is an opportunity to shirk and to act opportunistically. Value dependency 
can occur at the same time as investment-dependency, but not necessarily so. 
Investment-dependency is a connectivity at the input-side, while value-dependency is 
a connectivity at the output-side. In the first-mentioned situation, there are no technical 
opportunities to invest alone, or it it would be economically unwise to do so.  
(3) Result-disproportionality depicts the situation in which the individual participant’s 
costs are not in equilibrium with the individual benefits. Disproportionality can be the 
result of causal effects within the supply chain. Redistribution of the project-related 
benefits will be necessary to provide incentives to the partners to continue 
participation. 
(4) Value-displacement (or a-causality) is the situation in which extra efforts displayed at 
one stage in the supply chain cause extra benefits in a different stage, or vice versa. 
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This is for instance the case in the BRC- or EurepGap guidelines, in which upstream 
standards imposed by food-retailers are prescribed to reduce food safety risks, increase 
product quality or improve supply chain efficiency, predictability and/or effectiveness.  
Value-alignment (causality) is the situation in which costs (efforts) and benefits 
(advantages) coincide in the same stage of the supply chain. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 describe two extreme situations. Figure 3 entails a situation of investment 
independence, value-independence, result-proportionality and causality. 
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Figure 3: Example of a supply chain with complete project independence 
 
In a situation of complete project independence, each company considers its investment 
opportunities on a firm level. The benefits are evaluated and harvested just like any other 
firm-specific project. Should one participant opt out, the remaining partners in the consortium 
can go on without any damage. The possibilities for opportunism are absent, which would 
even be the case if result-disproportionality occurs. However, in that case the willingness to 
participate will possibly depend on the moral obligation the partners feel to share the 
advantages. An example of a project in the case base that fell within this category is “Energy 
reduction in the pork meat chain”.  Participants were energy providing companies as well as 
participants in the supply chain, without the aim to make common investments but searching 
to benefit from acquiring knowledge together, in order to reduce the energy consumption in 
the supply chain. 
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Figure 4: Example of a supply chain with complete project dependence 
 
On the other extreme of the scale, figure 4 describes the extreme situation in which parties 
engage in a common investment, and the costs & benefits are a-causally distributed over the 
participants. In the situation depicted in figure 4, opportunities exist to shirk and to secure a 
disproportional part of the benefits a project. Negotiations can either focus on the distribution 
of the initial investment costs over de participants, or focus at the redistribution of the 
benefits. An example of a project in the case base that falls within this blueprint is “Easy 
Slurry System”. It encompasses a joint investment in technology development and a pilot 
plant by three companies: a processor of swill (waste from restaurants and catering 




3. Measuring and redistributing costs and benefits in supply chain projects 
 
In this section specific complexities in measuring supply chain results are described, and 
completed with an overview of available accounting techniques (§ 3.1-2). Next we will 
describe possibilities to redistribute the cooperation results (§ 3.3). 
 
3.1 Measurement problems 
Measurement problems of supply chain results increase uncertainty among project partners 
(Bremmers, 2006). Uncertainty can be exploited by partners to their own benefit. In general, 
the transaction costs for a project (vested in negotiating contractual conditions, monitoring 
and control) will increase substantially if accounting procedures remain vague and project 
outcomes cannot be determined with a reasonable amount of certainty. Measurement 
problems are vested in (Broens and Bremmers, 2007): 
- the time horizon of projects; 
- tacit project assets and results; 
- the existence of opportunity costs;  
- vague accounting procedures; 
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- the occurrence of common costs; 
- accounting procedures. 
 
Time horizon 
In most cases, the time horizon of supply chain projects is long-term. However, earnings will 
possibly be negative in the first years (cash-outflows will exceed cash inflows), creating 
problems in estimating growth rates (they would be negative) and therefore in assessing the 
net present value of cash flows to a chain project (Damodaran 2000). It often is not clear what 
cash flows will be generated, at what moment in time, and (thus) what the risk is to individual 
project participants. Moreover, risk perceptions between partners can be different, so that a 
project which is acceptable for one partner, is rejected by another.   
 
Tacit assets and results 
Assets and results will often be tacit of a kind (like knowledge, network relationships, trust, 
connectivity, goodwill etc.) and hard to explicate among chain partners. Moreover, the change 
in asset-value can be asymmetrically distributed over the partners, and can possibly be hidden 
to the consortium. 
  
Existence of opportunity costs 
Opportunity costs are not accounted for in profit calculations in most cases. But chain projects 
will be confronted with opportunity costs, if scarce resources are to be re-allocated to serve 
common goals. Opportunity costs are the implicit (shadow-)prices of such resources. They 
represent foregone gross profits. Such opportunity costs depend on the alternatives that 
individual partners have to employ their resources. These ‘costs’ are, in principle, hidden to 
the other participants. Hidden costs can disturb fair negotiations about redistribution of 
common benefits, since the complete ‘pie’ is unknown. Opportunity costs may be completely 
clear within one company but lead to unexpected project halts if not shared between project 
members. After extensive studies, supported by all partners, at least one project in the case 
base, concerning retail logistics, promised high returns if investments were made in the retail 
warehouse. Yet this recommendation never reached beyond the study stage since the 
opportunity costs of the warehouse owner had not been accounted for. 
 
Existence of common costs 
In supply chain operations more than one product at the same time can be produced. For 
instance, a rape seed supply chain can result in the production of bio-fuel, protein as well as 
feed for animals. The allocation of investment and operational costs to these different but 
causally related project results is arbitrary and questionable. An example of a project with 
common-cost problems in the food industry is the creation of value out of remainders of grain 
in producing beer (project “Bierbostel” in the case base).  
 
Accounting procedures 
Different accounting procedures can be applied by partners in a supply-chain, and at different 
stages in the project. A prominent distinction in this respect is cash accounting versus accrual 
accounting. Within the accrual accounting context, a multitude of different valuation methods 
can be applied (see for instance: Barfield et al., 1994; Morse and Zimmerman, 1997). 
Moreover, accrual accounting does not recognize the time value of money, which is important 
in assessing the viability of follow-ups in a chain project. Where cash accounting should be 
applied, it is common practice to apply accrual accounting (e.g. Activity Based Costing) 
especially in the feasibility stage of a project.  
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Another reason to prefer cash accounting over accrual accounting is the aforementioned 
opportunity costs problem. In a retail logistics project (included in the case base), the option 
which lead to the utmost optimal alternative from an accrual accounting perspective required 
extensive investments by one single partner. Even with heavy compensation from other 
partners this investment seemed to be in conflict with a large incumbent investment project. 
By using cash accounting from the start, this could have been signaled in an early stage. In 
doing so,  the seemingly optimal alternative could have been excluded in favor of a more 
realistic one. 
 
In accrual accounting a distinction can be made between product- and period costs. Whether 
costs are attributed to single products (project-outcomes) or taken as a loss in one lump-sum 
(period costs) makes a lot of difference if project outcomes are heterogeneous, spread over 
different parties, or are driven by a multitude of causal factors. 
 
Supply chain cooperation (in other projects than just for acquiring knowledge) is often 
intended to be long-term of a kind. Therefore the relative proportion of fixed costs (like 
depreciation, financing costs, etc.) in the cost base will be considerable. The attribution of 
fixed costs to single products is more problematic than the assignment of variable short-term 
cost components. Moreover,  a side-effect of the dominance of fixed costs is that it has an 
accelerating effect on operational leverage. This, in turn, has a negative effect on the net-value 
of future returns. The present disclosure of the ex-post profitability by individual firms is 
based on neo-classical economic theory, which induces that performance measurement 
instruments are output-oriented and profit-related (Gerlowski, 1996). The present focus of 
firms’ accounting systems has major disadvantages (Bremmers, 2001): profit measurement is 
carried out retrospectively, the accountant’s profit measurement lacks the inclusion of risk as 
a significant part of business performance (Hardaker and Huirne 1997), and business 
performance is described in a single measure. Profitability as a single performance criterion 
lacks managerial significance (Noori and Radford, 1995). Historical data are commonly used 
in published reports. It follows again that more emphasis should be placed on cash-accounting 
which is mandatory for decision making (Brealey and Myers, 1991), rather than accrual 
accounting. In practice, however, accrual accounting is applied in most cases. 
  
3.2  Cost assignment processes and problems 
Different cost assignment systems can be used to measure costs and benefits of supply chain 
projects. The following procedures are of significance for supply chain project partnering and 
its continuity.  
 
Differential accounting 
For assessing the financial consequences of a supply chain project, differential costs and 
benefits (accrual accounting) or cash flows (cash accounting) should be measured  The sum of 
the participants’ differential costs and benefits is the net-benefit of a chain project. Mandatory 
conditions for the use of such an approach are however: outcomes have to be identifiable and 
attributable to the project. Preferably only one cost-driver is discerned (such as production, 
transport-kilometers or energy-usage); this simplifies the measurement of cost-effectiveness 
of single projects and their comparability with alternatives. However, in practice more than 
one cost-driver will occur in most cases (compare the differentiation in quality costs in the 
Cost of Quality-model; Hackman and Wageman, 1995). 
 
Apportionment of indirect costs 
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A project can render a multitude of different outcomes. In that case, indirect costs 
(‘overhead’) will occur and will have to be assigned to the different cost objects. In practice, 
often a mark-up percentage is applied, which can lead to invalid conclusions about the cost-
effectiveness of measures. In the project “Biological breakdown of plant pots” (see Annex), 
an attribution of overhead using a mark-up percentage indicated that the process would be too 
expensive. With the use of mark-up percentages indirect costs (which are probably to a 
majority fixed of a kind) are treated as if they were variable. A more sophisticated method is 
activity based costing (ABC), as was applied for instance in the project “Sylonet” from our 
case base (TNO, 2003). However, ABC will require an elaborated chain information system, 
and an integration of information systems of participants. 
 
Result measures 
Accrual accounting based result measures, such as Return On Investment, Return on Equity, 
or Return on Assets, can induce invalid decision making and lead to unjustified conclusions 
on the profitability of alternative supply chain configurations. Such result measures are fed by 
ex-post figures on costs and benefits, use arbitrary procedures for product- or period 
matching, and (therefore) enable “window dressing”. Risk (the counterpart of profit) is not 
included in the estimates. Also, as expressed already, opportunity costs are not considered. In 
contrast, the cash-based net present value (NPV) method focuses on generating cash rather 
than profits, and it adjusts cash flows for risk. Cash accounting systems take the timing of 
revenues into account. The net present value (NPV) is the value of the project adjusted for 
time preference and risk. Problematic in this respect is the fact that the (risk-adjusted) rate 
which partners apply to discount cash flows depends on the (marginal) financing costs at the 
individual firm level. Costs of financing as well as financial structure are important 
determinants for the minimal required return in projects. Debt financing accelerates the 
measure for systematic risk of equity (Brealey and Myers, 1991), which in turn can induce 
different project acceptance rates for different chain partners. It also increases financial risk 
(Ross, 2007). Likely, the effects of firm-specific financial leverage will be hidden to partners 
in supply chain projects. This asymmetric information distribution about the financing of 
chain projects (which is at the discretion of the individual firms) can obstruct cooperation on 
acquiring a common asset base. 
 
Differences in cost assignment procedures between chain partners can induce differences in 
project evaluation, opportunistic behavior and the occurrence of incomplete information and 
contracts, both at the beginning of and during a supply chain project. The level to which this 
will hamper chain project cooperation will depend on the specifics of the project (§ 2.1). The 
impact is more serious with complete project dependence (figure 4) than in a situation of 
complete project independence (figure 3). The involvement of neutral advisors or knowledge 
institutes can alleviate the inconsistencies and provoke more transparency, at least towards 
this entity. It requires however a pro-active and assertive position of these entities on the point 
of the accounting methods chosen.  
  
3.3 Chain result redistribution 
 
Uncertainty about the distribution of costs and benefits over chain partners, combined with 
measurement uncertainties and asset specific investments are major causes for abundant 
transaction costs. Transaction costs of cooperation of independent parties can lead to the 
abandonment of such joint operations or, at the other extreme, to vertical integration. 
Redistribution problems can be solved along different routes, which are described here. 
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Criterion 1: optimal pricing rules for (intermediate) products 
If intermediate markets exist for the goods and services exchanged between chain partners, 
the differential market value  (increased selling price because of improved product quality, the 
valorisation of a by-product etc.) can serve as a reward and (re)distribution criterion (Drury, 
1992). Each single contributor will compare the differential benefits/cash-inflows with his 
differential costs/cash-outflows. If the return is below his minimal required level (which is 
dependent on his investment alternatives) he will opt out unless additional compensation is 
granted. Such additional compensation can possibly be acquired by means of exertion of 
power (especially in case of  investment-dependency). From transfer pricing theory 
(Bremmers and Hagelaar, 1996) it can be learned, that if no perfect market conditions exist 
and no bottlenecks in production capacity are limiting the individual output, the optimal 
adjusted transfer price within a supply chain could be set at a level where the marginal costs 
of the supplier equal the net marginal returns of the buyer. Should however capacity 
bottlenecks exist, Solomon’s rule (Drury, 1992) has to be applied: the optimal transfer price 
equals variable costs plus opportunity costs.  
 
Criterion 2: Fair play 
The neoclassical picture of a firm as being a selfish, profit-maximizing entity should be 
supplemented by the firm as a social entity. Over-exploitation of chain partners would lead to 
non-sustainable projects or partnerships. If from a behavioral perspective the neoclassical 
pricing rule prescribes the use of variable costs as a transaction price, for the partners to 
remain in business the supplier should at least be compensated for fixed costs by a lump sum 
transfer or otherwise. Fairness is not defined in cost accounting. In game theory however, 
formal definitions of fair distributions are cautiously defined. For projects, a ´fair´ 
compensation is defined in a differential way: the payoff of the project to any single partner 
should be balanced to its contribution. The Shapley-Aumann value allows to calculate the 
equilibrium project redistribution, based on some simple rules like symmetry among partners. 
In the case base, the project ‘Sylonet’ – concerning cooperative transport operations between 
competitors - applied this rather elaborate value and found it quite similar to a simple pricing 
heuristic, which was indeed applied into a successful chain cooperation. 
 
Criterion 3: Disagreement payoff 
From the cooperative game-theory, a precondition for commitment to cooperation can be 
retrieved from the concept of the “disagreement payoff”. In the common situation where 
chain partners have an option to act outside the project, the minimum net contribution of the 




Once the necessity and willingness to redistribute have been agreed upon, the technical 
compensation scheme can be either a single, a lump-sum compensation or a periodic 
compensation. A lump sum should naturally be based on the differential NPV’s of the project 
participants; a periodic compensation can be based on differential cash flows in single periods 
or on a adaptation of the intermediate transaction price. 
Furthermore, the compensation can be either by means of a (a) real-cost/benefit 
compensation, or alternatively by (b) a real cash outflow/inflow compensation. The 
disadvantage of a cost/benefit compensation is vested in the fact that it is spread over time. 
Supply-chain projects will use extensive cash funds in the execution-phase. This can represent 
a prohibitive burden, especially for SMEs. For instance, this has been brought forward as an 
explanation for the relatively low proliferation of ECR projects among the smaller retail 
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suppliers in the nineties. However, ex ante compensation will require the help of financial 
institutions or equity providers. They will require guarantees with respect to the long-term 
viability of a project, which are not easily granted if project uncertainties exist.  
The above-mentioned theoretical considerations will be confronted with the practical reality 
in the next paragraph. 
 
4. Materials and results 
 
4.1. Description and methodology 
 
Experiences with measuring and (re-)-distributing costs and benefits in supply chains have 
been gathered by means of semi-structured interviews with participants in 20 supply chain 
projects of different Dutch subsidizing agencies ACC, DKE and SenterNovem. A total of 5 
DKE-projects were taken into account, of which 4 were initiated by private business. Of the 
ACC-projects 13 have been reviewed, of which 9 were initiated by private business and 4 by 
a research institute. Only two SenterNovem projects were considered. The themes that are 
covered are diverse and range from cost reduction to chain positioning, quality assurance and 
re-use of waste. After selecting suitable projects in a meeting with the subsidizing agencies 
(ACC, DKE and SenterNovem), key informants were contacted during July-November 2006. 
In semi-structured interviews, among other the following questions had been addressed:  
- who invests in the project, and are these investments made on an individual or a 
 collective basis? 
- does a situation of value dependency occur? 
- does a situation of result proportionality occur? 
- does a situation of value displacement occur? 
- do negotiations take place/have they taken place with respect to the distribution of 
 costs and benefits? 




As some of the projects were still in progress when the interviews took place, information was 
not always available on the complete set of questions. In case of doubt or lack of reliable data 
to date of performing the research (mid 2006 – end of 2006), conclusions were postponed. 
The main results for the 20 projects are included in the Annex. The results of the structured 
interviews contained also statements of problems encountered during the execution of 
projects, personal notes, as well as motivations and observations which were perceived to be 
relevant for decision making about continued participation (or the alternative: opting out). 
In the previous sections, the theoretical considerations were were underpinned with reference 
to individual cases. With respect to the more general results, the most robust ones are 
mentioned here. 
1. In a significant number of projects no formal estimations were made about future 
results. If such calculations were made, the methods used were primitive in most 
cases, the calculations were not very robust and were made on an individual basis, 
instead of a collective one. So, from a TCE-perspective, there appears to be 
considerable uncertainty about the future results of projects.  
2. Opting out comes, in most cases, as a surprise, and can be explained by often 
involuntary in-transparency and lacking commitment from the start on. Each sub-
contract (see § 2.2) is governed by its own rules and deeper motivations. Different 
time horizons and strategic considerations play a significant role. For one partner a 
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motivation to participate is watching and observing “so that the boat is not missed”. 
Another partner the consultant or research institute that wishes to use surplus research 
capacity. Also the project time for scientific institutes is shorter than for the supply 
chain partners, who will have to go on long after the research institute has proposed 
solutions for chain problems. So research institutes will include different cash flow 
streams than project partners, and are by nature less interested in survival of the 
consortium. 
3. Supply chain projects unroll in respective stages: orientation phase, feasibility 
assessment, design stage, realization and exploitation. In each stage different 
accounting methods are used. This can partly be explained by the participants’ 
psychological inclinations. In each stage the commitment of participants is different, 
and motives to continue participation are different.. In the orientation phase, generally 
the focus is on the benefits, and no critical review takes place of the financial 
consequences of chain cooperation beyond the direct costs of project meetings. In the 
subsequent stage, a feasibility study will include a serious evaluation of one or several 
alternatives on the future cost and benefits. The involvement of scientific research in 
many of the case base projects causes that the supply chain, as an abstract unit of 
calculation, is put central, at the cost of clarity on the pay-off to individual partners. 
The result of the study-of-feasibility phase should be an overview of intended 
investments and their financing as well as a plan for execution of the project. In the 
execution-phase the focus is on control of expenses and receipts. It should be noted, 
that in this phase expenses will exceed receipts, because of initial investment 
obligations. Last, during realization and exploitation the focus is on detailed 
monitoring, measuring outcomes and redistribution. 
4. Some projects came were successful.. Surprisingly, a number of projects which were 
meant to create a long-lasting cooperation and commitment to solve shared problems 
(with respect to quality, safety, environmental impacts etc.) came to a halt after the 
study-of-feasibility-phase. Even if they concluded good feasibility and recommended 
the project’s continuation forthwith. So indeed there seems to be a barrier between the 
study- and the design phase, as we concluded from cost accounting considerations. 
Stated reasonswere not just that the practical usefulness of the project was doubted, 
but also the lack of individual commitment from the start, and possibly the existence 
of hidden agendas. The eventual lack of structural commitment could have been 
brought to the surface at the start of projects, but for opportunistic reasons this is often 
“not done”.  
5.  Project initiations will not be sustainable if each party can pertain to its original 
strategy and does not have to commit itself to the initiated project, from the top-level 
of the organizations down. Involvement of top-management of the individual partners 
guarantees that project goals are regarded as significant to all participants. If such 
support is lacking, negotiations about measurement and redistribution of costs and 
benefits will have to be made in two cycles: the project team level and the firm-level. 
Agreement within the project team will not necessarily be supported by authorities of 
individual firms.  
 
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Conclusions can be drawn from a transaction cost perspective. The following statements are 
put forward to provoke discussion, rather than as a solid and proven methodology. However, 
within a grounded theory approach, they can serve as a benchmark for improving future 
project management. The remarks with respect to accounting of projects we make here, have 
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been combined with socio-psychological insights in a report to SenterNovem (Broens and 
Bremmers, 2007). A cd-rom (Senter Novem, 2007) was developed to help chain partners with 
including all the factors regarding project contributions and outcomes in their considerations 
in a more valid way. 
 
1. To reduce the possibilities to shirk and to enhance mutual trust and commitment at the 
beginning of projects, firm’s goals and expected results of a project should be stated in 
advance. An interactive multi-criteria approach can be applied. Chain-projects have to 
fit in the strategic agenda of each participant. Parties in chain projects could pretend 
commitment with the (only) purpose to gather information on the strategic intentions 
of fellow-companies. Opening up limits the opportunities to take advantage of hidden 
information and agendas. It is advised to make the goals of all project participants 
explicit by means of scoring tables (simple approach) or by means of Saaty’s 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
2. To limit the possibilities of double negotiations (at the project team level as well as 
firm level), which induces considerable transaction costs within the project, it should 
be ensured throughout whether the firm’s representative to the project has enough 
commitment from the delegating. This limits costs of negotiating contracts in the 
execution stage of a supply chain project. 
3.  Cash accounting should prevail in the feasilibity stage, in stead of accrual accounting. 
Accrual accounting lacks transparency to fellow chain-partners. It has been observed, 
that many projects start with accrual accounting combined with a process-orientation, 
and gradually change to cash accounting and an asset-orientation. It is preferable to 
stick to one set of techniques, which is relatively independent of the individual firms’ 
accounting systems. 
4. There are several ways of compensating for differences in costs and benefits of 
projects to individual firms. Partners should be informed about alternative ways to 
measure and distribute chain project results.  
5. The Shapley-Aumann value provides a fair distribution of costs and benefits. 
However, in practice slack for negotiation, possibilities to opt out and not explicitly 
formulated goals play a prominent role.  
 
In conclusion, a more systematic approach in project management can improve the survival 
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NO Limited YES NO NO None 
C Private 
business 



















YES YES n/a YES Not yet Rentability of 
processing 
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F Research  
institute 













basis     
n/a YES n/a Probably Not yet Cost price of production  
H Research 
institute 
Value creation of waste Together NO YES YES n/a YES “Sum of net benefits/3” 
I Research 
institute 
Reduction of failure costs  Limited, 
individual 
basis 
NO NO n/a n/a n/a n/a 
J Private 
business 
Value creation of waste Together NO YES YES NO YES None 
K Private 
business 








n/a YES n/a NO NO None 
M Research 
institute 
Knowledge; risk reduction 












n/a Limited n/a n/a n/a Economic feasibility 
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O Private business Product 
development/better usage 
of production capacity 
Limited, 
individually 
n/a YES n/a n/a NO n/a 
P Research institute Knowledge Limited, 
individual 
basis 
n/a NO n/a n/a NO n/a 
Q Research institute Knowledge, increase of 





n/a Limited n/a n/a NO None 
R Research Insitute Knowledge; strengthening 
market position 
Externally YES NO Not 
applicable 
NO NO None 
Coordination 
SenterNovem 
         
S n/a Energy reduction Not 
applicable 





Together NO NO n/a n/a Not yet None 
 
 
 
